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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
SOME EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
W. E. Benton*
F OR many years there has been much interest in the develop-
ment of an international penal or criminal law, as well as the
establishment of an international criminal court. The persistent
search for the juridical formula is noticeable in the numerous
conferences and the literature on the subject. In the words of Judge
Manley 0. Hudson, such indicates "the spell which the idea of an
international criminal court [has] exercised on many minds."'
Although "European jurists hdve long been preoccupied with the
problem of international penal law, it has largely been ignored by
Anglo-American jurists. The latter have been content to allow this
complicated subject to be dealt with through private international
law, which they prefer to term conflicts of law, or through the
processes of extradition."2 Nevertheless, since the termination of
World War II, Anglo-American jurists, as well as jurists of other
countries, have manifested a serious interest in the problem of an
international penal jurisdiction.8
Some of the thinking on the matter of an international criminal
jurisdiction envisages a world criminal code, applicable alike to
States as well as individuals, and effective in times of peace and
war. Such is the nature of the proposed criminal statute ("Plan
for a World Criminal Code") prepared by Professor V. V. Pella
*Assistant Professor of Government, Southern Methodist University; Ph.D., Uni-
versity of Texas. The author was assisted in the preparation of this article by a grant
from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
I Editorial Comment, "The Proposed International Criminal Court," 32 Am. J. Int.
L. 549, 551 (1938), and references cited.
2 Editorial Comment by Philip Marshall Brown, "International Criminal Justice,"
35 Am. J. Int. L. 118, 119 (1941).
3 See Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction
(memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General), United Nations, Lake Success,
New York, 1949, hereinafter referred to as Historical Survey.
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of Rumania, and published by the International Association of
Criminal Law in 1935.' Other efforts have been concerned with
such matters as terrorism,' genocide,6 human rights,' formulation
4 The Plan, with some additions, was republished in 1946. The English text of the
Plan may be found in the Revue Internationale de Droit P6nal, 1946, No. 3, pp. 249-262.
In 1937 the International Conference on Terrorism was held in Geneva. As a result
of this Conference two conventions were opened for signature on November 16, 1937:
The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and the Convention
for the Creation of an International Criminal Court. Neither of these Conventions
came into force because of the failure of the States to deposit their ratifications. The
General Convention of November 16, 1937, was limited to cases involving terrorism,
was optional, and only included the criminal responsibilities of individuals. "Neverthe-
less," in the words of Professor Pella, "it marked a decisive turning-point in the
history of contemporary public law. For the first time the regular rendition of interna-
tional judgments in criminal cases was contemplated...." Towards an International
Criminal Court, 44 Am. J. Int. L. 37, 39 (1950). For the text of the two proposed con-
ventions see 7 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (1935-1937) 862-893.
c, The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris
on December 9, 1948. On January 12, 1951, the Convention became effective for certain
States which previously had deposited their ratifications or accessions. Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 45 Am. J. Int. L., Official
Documents, pp. 7-10 (1951). Extensive hearings have been held on the Convention in
the United States. See Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
T The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved by the United Nations
General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948. The United Nations Commission on
Human Rights has, for some time, been concerned with the problem of preparing a
draft Covenant on Human Rights. When the Covenant is finally approved by the Gen-
eral Assembly, it will be submitted to the States for ratification. Article 11(1) of the
draft Covenant (as revised in 1950) appears to be based upon the existence of an inter-
national criminal code or the formulation of such a code in the future. This Article
provides, "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international
law, at the time when it was committed." A similar statement was included in Article
11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See James Simsarian, Proposed
Human Rights Covenant, revised at 1950 Session of Commission on Human Rights,
Department of State Publication 3894, reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin
of June 12, 1950. Also see, by the same author, Draft International Covenant on Human
Rights Revised at 1950 Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
45 Am. J. Int. L. 170 (1951). There have been some regional developments in the field
of human rights. For example, the American Declaration of The Rights and Duties
of Man was approved by the Ninth International Conference of American States, meeting
in Bogoti, Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948. 43 Am. J. Int. L.. Official Documents.
pp. 133-139 (1949), Also, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was signed at Rome, November 4, 1950. As a result of the latter
Convention, Members of the Council of Europe have taken "the first steps for the
collective enforcement 'of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration"
of Human Rights. The Convention provides for the establishment of a European Court
of Human Rights (Section IV, Article 38). See 45 Am. J. Int. L., Official Documents,
pp. 24-39 (1951).
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of the Niirnberg Principles,' preparation of a draft code of of-
fences against the peace and security of mankind,9 and the estab-
lishment of an international criminal court.'" Thus, the question
of an international penal law covers a broad field. For this reason
this study will be limited, for the most part, to the early develop-
ment of that phase of the criminal jurisdiction referred to in
recent years as crimes against peace. The latter, as defined in
the Charter of The Niirnberg Tribunal, includes the "planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplish-
ment of any of the foregoing." This concept of criminality had an
interesting development during the formative years.
8 On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution
(95 (1)) directing its Committee on the Progressive Development of International
Law and its Codification "to treat as a 'matter of primary importance plans for the
formulation, in the context of a general codification of offences against the peace and
security of mankind, or of an International Criminal Code, of the principles recognized
in the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal." The
International Law Commission, as successor to the Committee on the Progressive Devel-
opment of International Law and its Codification, has adopted seven principles recog-
nized in the Charter and Judgment of the Niirnberg Tribunal. Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission, Second Session, June 5-July 29, 1950, 44 Am. J. Int. L.,
Official Documents, pp. 125-134 (1950).
9 The Niirnberg principles have, with certain modifications, been incorporated in
the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Report of
The International Law Commission, Third Session, May 16-July 27, 1951, 45 Am. J. Int.
L., Official Documents, pp. 123-132 (1951). Also see A Memorandum on the Draft Code
of Ogenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, prepared by Professor V. V.
Pella at the request of the Secretariat of the United Nations. This Memorandum was
presented to The International Law Commission (U. N. General Assembly, Doe.
A/cn.4/39, Nov. 24, 1950).
10 Lord Phillimore, An International Criminal Court and the Resolutions of the
Committee of Jurists, 3 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 79-86 (1922-1923) ; J. L. Brierly, Do We Need
An International Criminal Court? 8 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 81-88 (1927) ; V. V. Pella,
Towards An International Criminal Court, 44 Am. J. Int. L. 37 (1950) ; V. V. Pella,
Memorandum on the Establishment of An International Criminal Court (prepared on
request of the Secretariat of the United Nations and presented to the Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction), U. N. General Assembly, Doc. A/AC.48/3, July 17,
1951; Draft Statute for An International Criminal Court, prepared by the United
Nations Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 Am. J. Int. L., Official
Documents, pp. 1-11 (1952) ; Antonio Sottile, The Problem of the Creation of a Perma-
nent International Criminal Court, Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplo-
matiques et Politiques, Oct.-Dec., 1951, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 267-362; Quincy Wright,
Proposal for an International Criminal Court, 46 Am. J. Int. L. 60-72 (1952) ; and the
various proposals and draft statutes included in Historical Survey, op. cit. supra note 3.
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In Plato's Republic Socrates and Glaucon discussed what acts
should be forbidden in a quarrel or disorder between Greek
States." Socrates suggested that such quarrels should be conducted
solely with a view to reconciliation; that friendly correction should
be the objective rather than the enslavement or destruction of one
or more of the parties involved. "And as they are Hellenes them-
selves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses,
not even suppose that the whole population of a city-men, women,
and children-are equally their enemies, for they know that the
guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many
are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling
to waste their lands and raze their houses; their enmity to them
will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the
guilty few to give satisfaction."' 2 A similar view was expressed by
Polybius when he declared, "The purpose with which good men
make war is not to destroy and annihilate the wrongdoers, but to
reform and alter the wrongful acts; nor is it their object to involve
the innocent in the destruction of the guilty.... ."" At least some of
the early philosophers thought in terms of punitive action which
could be taken against those individuals who made war. It will
be noted that responsibility was confined to a "few persons." It
was not a collective or State responsibility. Such a concept of "war
guilt," which constitutes a vital part of an international criminal
jurisdiction, was formulated long before the termination of World
Wars I and II.
11 Socrates and Glaucon were of the opinion that only a fight between Hellenes and
barbarians should be called a war; "but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall
say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends;
and such enmity is to be called discord." REPUBLIC (The Modern Library, Jowett's
trans.) Bk. V, 470, pp. 198.199.
12 Id., Bk. V, 471, pp. 199-200.
is 2 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GRECE AND ROME (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1911) 192.
[Vol. 8
1954] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
The ancient College of Fetials (Collegium Fetialium), which
conducted Roman relations with foreign nations performed a
variety of sacerdotal (priestly), diplomatic, and judicial func-
tions. Among the more important judicial functions was the deter-
mination of whether or not a war was a just war.15 Not only did
the fetials consider the legality of the preliminary proceedings,
but also made a determination whether or not there existed a just
cause for war. The decision of the fetials in this matter had a great
influence on the action taken in the Senate.16
The doctrine of the "just war" (iustum bellum) was recognized
by Roman Law. Therefore, to conduct this type of war certain
specific rules and ceremonies had to be followed-for such war
14 The Magister Fetialium, a permanent functionary, presided over the College of
Fetials. The latter, as guardian of the ius jetiale, was composed of twenty priests.
Their term of office was for life, unless they committed a serious offence against the
Senate and people. The Pater Patratus, who was elected by his colleagues, served as
"chief of the fetials" or their spokesman when members of the College were sent
abroad on diplomatic missions, or for negotiating the extradition of offenders, and
for declaring war.
15 Other functions performed by the College of Fetials were as follows: (1) "In
their priestly capacity they presided over the expiatory sacrifices and the performance
of solemnities that were incidental to the commencement of war, the establishment of
peace, the conclusion of treaties, and other interstatal affairs of importance" (2 COLE-
MAN PHILLIPSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 326). (2) If Rome wished to register a com-
plaint or demand against another State, such was formulated and presented by the
fetials. According to the ius fetiale, Rome was prohibited from waging war until an
attempt had been made to secure a peaceful settlement of the issue. (3) The fetials
were employed to declare war and conclude peace, as well as negotiate treaties of
friendship and alliances. (4) International claims which Rome had against foreign
States, or claims by the latter against Rome, fell within the province of the fetials.
(5) The latter negotiated the extradition of foreigners to stand trial in Rome, as well
as the delivery of Roman citizens which had offended foreign States. (6) The fetials
could give their opinion in regard to whether or not treaty-rights had been violated,
and if so, they could demand restitution. (7) "They also took cognizance of offences
committed against ambassadors, and investigated the transgressions of the generals
with respect to the sponsiones they made with the enemy without the sanction of their
government" (id. at 328).
I6 In the early period the vote of the senatorial majority in favor of war was con-
sidered final, but from about the beginning of the Fifth Century B. C. the question
had to be considered by the Comitia Centuriata or Assembly of the people, and if they
approved, it became a Lex Centuriata. Upon the approval of war by both the Senate
and Assembly of the people, the fetials were dispatched to the Roman frontier, and
issued a formal declaration of war.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
was a legal institution involving both rights and duties.17 Accord-
ing to Professor Oppenheim, Roman Law recognized four just
causes of war, namely: "(1) violation of the Roman dominions;
(2) violation of ambassadors; (3) violation of treaties; (4) sup-
port given during war to an opponent by a hitherto friendly
State.""8 Even in the case of a just cause for war, the resort to
armed force was only justifiable after satisfaction had been de-
manded and refused. In case of refusal, war was formally
declared by a varying number of fetials proceeding to the Roman
frontier, and there, after making a formal declaration of war,
hurling a spear into the enemy's territory. Such action symbolized
the existence of hostilities.
Embedded in the fetials' demand for satisfaction or justice
(res repetere), in the event Rome had a grievance against a
foreign State, was the early concept of an international criminal
jurisdiction. For example, "In 320 B.C. envoys were sent to the
Samnites to demand the surrender of the author of the war which
the latter had waged against Rome."19 The Romans, like the
Greeks, were aware of such concepts as "acts of aggression" (espe-
cially when committed against Roman territory), and the doc-
trine of "criminal liability." In other words, a punitive war could
be waged in order to punish those guilty of such acts of aggression.
It is true that the fetiale procedure, as a means of determining
the existence of a just cause for war, did reflect certain weaknesses.
For example, Rome was not only a party to the dispute, but also
judge of its own cause. Also, it may have been that at times the
17 If the analogy is not carried too far, the proceedings preliminary to war did
approach the procedure evolved for ordinary actions at law consisting of a demand
and deposit, formal notice, reply, oral pleadings, determination, and final settlement.
1s1 L. OPPENI'ZIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (New York: Longmans, Green
& Co., 7th ed., H. Lauterpacht, 1948) 72-73. Quoted by permission of the publisher.
Cf. Amos S. Hershey, The History of International Relations During Antiquity and The
Middle Ages: International Law Impossible Before the Rise of the Modern European
State System, 5 Am. J. Int. L. 901 n. 66, 920 (1911) and 2 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 182. For specific examples of the various causes of war see id. at
182-191.
19 2 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 332 (Liv. VIII. 39).
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College of Fetials was under the complete domination of the
Roman Senate-exercising little or no independent power. Fur-
thermore, that part of the fetiale procedure concerned with the
formalities preliminary to a declaration of war was, on occasion,
dispensed with by the Romans, or used by the latter as cover for
waging an unjustifiable war. Nevertheless, the ancient College of
Fetials, the Ius Fetiale, and the Fetiale Procedure made a rather
significant contribution to the development of international law.
The doctrine of the "just war" had a profound influence on the
Catholic School of International Law, Hugo Grotius, and other
writers in the field of international jurisprudence.
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), and
Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767) gave serious consideration to
penal offences committed by states and individuals. They were
influenced by the doctrine of the "just" and "unjust" cause of war
which had been popularized previously by certain representatives
of the Spanish-Catholic School of International Law, notably
Francisco Vitoria (1480-1546), Francisco Sudrez (1548-1617),
and Balthasar Ayala (1548.1584). Hugo Grotius, the founder
of modern international law, observed, "Authorities generally
assign to wars three justifiable causes, defence, recovery of prop-
erty, and punishment."' Also, the maltreatment of envoys was
considered by the distinguished scholar as a just cause for war.'
Furthermore, "wars are justly waged against those who treat
Christians with cruelty for the sake of their religion alone22 . . .
[and] against those who show impiety toward the gods they be-
lieve in."2 His list of the unjust causes of war was summarized
20 De lure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, James Brown Scott, 1925) Bk. II, Ch. I, § 11 (2),
p. 171.
21 Id., Bk. I, Ch. II, § 11 (2), p. 55.
22 1d., Bk. II, Ch. XX, § XLIX, p. 517.




Grotius definitely believed a State could commit a criminal act.
Such state crimes reflect the influence of the just and unjust war
concept. Acts which he considered state crimes include the
following:
[1] . .. waging war on another nation that has done nothing to deserve
this behaviour, 25 [2] claiming parts of the free sea as one's territory,
[3] claiming the territory of an uncivilized or heathen people, [4]
disturbing the home-rule of a sovereign country, [5] violating the
persons and rights of envoys, [6] violating an alliance or other treaty,
[7] violating peace conditions, [8] calumnying or teasing a foreign
nation, [9] robbing a foreign nation or the family of nations, [10]
hampering or prohibiting lawful navigation and trade or monopoliz-
ing the same . . . , [11] invading the territory of outsiders in war,
[12] supporting.., a belligerent who fights in an apparently unjust
cause, [13] allowing citizens (or: other persons within their territory)
to commit crimes, [14] leaving crimes committed by its own envoys
unpunished, [15] leaving crimes committed against foreigners un-
punished, [16] treating Christians with cruelty merely because of their
religion, and [17] waging an unjust war even when it is not a war
as mentioned [in No. 1] .26
24 Among the unjust causes of war were the following: "[11 the fear of something
uncertain, . . . fear with respect to a neighboring power is not a sufficient cause, [21
Another such cause is advantage apart from necessity, [3] the refusal of marriage, when
there is a great abundance of marriageable women, [41 the desire for richer land,
[5] to claim for oneself by right of discovery what is held by another, [61 the desire
for freedom among a subject people, [7] the desire to rule others against their will
on the pretext that it is for their good, [8] title to universal empire which some give
to the Emperor, [9] title to universal empire which others give to the Church, [101 the
desire to fulfil prophecies, without the command of God, [11] the desire to obtain
something that is owed by an obligation not strictly legal but arising from some
other source (id., Bk. II, Ch. XXII, pp. 546-556), [121 Wars . .. against those who are
unwilling to accept the Christian religion (id., Bk. II, Ch. XX, § XLVIII, p. 516),[and] [13] Wars . . . against those who err in the interpretation of the Divine Law;
as is proven by authorities and examples" (id., Bk. II, Ch. XX, § L, p. 518).
25 C. VAN VOLLENHOVEN, THE FRAMEWORK OF GROTIUS' BOOK DE JURE BELL Ac
PACTS (1625) (Uitgave Van de N. V. Noord-Hollandsche, Uitgeversmaatschappij,
Amsterdam, 1931) 71 (110).
26 Id. at 74, 75 (112). Also, "A state is held committing a crime if its population
begins to abolish the idea that there is a divinity having a care for the affairs of
men, worships evil spirits known as such, shows impiety towards the gods they believe
in, worship their gods with the shedding of innocent blood, sins against nature, acts
with impiety towards their parents, feeds on human flesh, kills their guests, practises
piracy." Id. at 75 (113).
[Vol. 8
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The most serious state crimes, according to Grotius, were those
which endangered the whole society of mankind. For among
"crimes that form of injustice is prominent which disturbs the
public order and therefore harms the greatest number. Next in
importance comes the injustice which affects individuals." 7
One of the justifiable causes for waging war, as noted above,
was to inflict punishment on a State which had committed an
injustice or criminal act. In other words, a State had the right
to wage a punitive war, because "wars are usually begun for the
purpose of exacting punishment."2 This right to punish state
crimes dominated Grotius' thinking. "Here lies the culmination
of Grotius' book; this is the summit which his reasoning tries to
reach."2 Nevertheless, Grotius warned that war should not be
undertaken rashly, even for just causes.8"
One of the difficult problems which confronted Grotius involved
27 op. cit. supra note 20, Bk. II, Ch. XX, § XXX (1), pp. 495, 496.
28 Id., Bk. II, Ch. XX, § XXXVIII, p. 502.
29 op. cit. supra note 25, at 80 (122).
30 For example, "In one of Christ's parables it is said that, if a king has to strive
in war with another king, he will first sit down, as is the custom of those who take
counsel seriously, and will weigh within himself whether he who has ten thousand
soldiers can be a match for an enemy who leads twice that number. If he sees that he
will not be a match for his adversary, before the foe comes within his borders he
will send an embassy with instructions to arrange a peace .... If, from the moral point
of view at any rate, the matter under consideration seems to have an equal effectiveness
for good and for evil, it is to be chosen only if the good has somewhat more of good
than the evil has of evil. [Quoting Aristides.] 'When the good is less than the evil, it
is better to give up the good. . . . [Again quoting Aristides.] 'Whenever fear is greater
than hope, why is it not right to take precautions?' . . . As Aristides rightly says, it is
the custom to save the ship by casting out the cargo, not the passengers .... [war is
not to be waged on such a pretext [to exact penalties] against him whose forces are
equal to our own. For, as in the case of a civil judge, he'who wishes to avenge crimes
by armed force ought to be much more powerful than the other party .... [According
to Augustus] war ought not be undertaken save when the hope of gain was shown to
be greater than the fear of loss. [Quoting Scipio Africanus and Lucius Aemilius Paulus.]
'One should not fight unless a supreme necessity or a most favourable opportunity
should be presented.' Such an opportunity will be found particularly when there
is hope that the matter may be settled by inspiring fear and on the strength of
reputation, with little or no risk. [For, according to Pliny] '[hie subdued by fear,
which is the most excellent kind of victory.'" Op. cit. supra note 20, Bk II, Ch. XXIV,
pp. 567-577. Also, "wars which are undertaken to inflict punishment are under suspicion
of being unjust, unless the crimes are very atrocious and very evident, or there is
some other coincident reason." Id., Bk. If, Ch. XX, § XLIII (3), p. 508.
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the question of punishment for state crimes. In short, where must
responsibility be located? Also, what type of punishment should
be exacted? Grotius believed that criminal sanctions could be ap-
plied to a State guilty of a public crime. "Here again . . he ap-
plied a close parallelism between individuals and states.""
. ..For the punishments of individuals and of a community are dif-
ferent. Just as death is at times the punishment for individuals, so
"the death of a state is its dissolution", and such dissolution takes place
when the civil body is dissolved ...
If now a state in this way ceases to exist, the right of enjoyment
therein ... is terminated as though by death. As a punishment, individ-
uals are reduced to slavery .... Similarly, too, a state suffers political
slavery in being reduced to a province. Individuals lose their property
by confiscation. In like manner it is customary to take from a state
also what belongs to it as a whole, its fortifications, naval arsenals,
ships of war, arms, elephants, public treasure, and public lands.
On the other hand, it is unjust for individuals to lose their private
property because of a wrong done by the community without their
consent .... 32
Furthermore, in the words of Grotius,
Subjection as a result of crime arises also without consent, when-
ever a person who has deserved to lose his liberty is by force brought
under the power of him who has the right to exact the penalty ....
In this way individuals can be brought under private subjection ...;
and also peoples can be brought into public subjection for a public
crime. But there is a difference in this respect, that the servitude of
a people is naturally lasting, since the succession of the parts does not
prevent it from remaining one people. On the other hand the penal
servitude of individuals does not pass beyond the persons themselves,
because the crime attaches to the person of the criminal. 33
At this point the important question arises, whether punishment
may be exacted always for the crime of a community. It seems that
such punishment may be exacted so long as the community exists,
31 Op; cit. supra note 25, at 77 (119).
32 Op. cit. supra note 20, Bk. II, Ch. XXI, § VII (2) and (3), p. 535.
33 Id., Bk. II, Ch. V, § XXXII, p. 259.
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because the same body remains, although composed of changing ele-
ments .... 34
Therefore, Grotius believed that the society of mankind could not
become a reality unless States were given the right to apply
coercion-especially armed coercion-against a State or States
guilty of an act of injustice. A State was obligated to observe
certain rights and duties in its relations with other States; other-
wise the law of mankind would be violated.
Grotius ignored-and would have rejected-the more modern doc-
trine according to which a corporate body cannot commit crimes ...
nor is he aware of the more modern doctrine that crime does not
exist but for a previous legislative provision .... But he taught that
a wrong is not to be deemed a crime unless for serious arguments;
and he carefully examined how, and when, and why states . . . can
deserve punishments, and what punishments may be applied 5 ....
Again, States, as well as individuals, may transgress the penal law.
Therefore, unjust nations, as well as their unjust leaders and
soldiers, could be punished, because the law of mankind was
binding upon both individuals and nations. In regard to individ-
ual punishment Grotius declared that
those persons are bound to make restitution who have brought about
. . . [an unlawful] war, either by the exercise of their power, or
through their advice. Their accountability concerns all those things,
of course, which ordinarily follow in the train of war; and even
unusual things, if they have ordered or advised any such thing, or
have failed to prevent it when they might have done so.
Thus also generals are responsible for the things which have been
done while they were in command; and all the soldiers that have
participated in some common act, as the burning of a city, are respon-
sible for the total damage. In the case of separate acts each is respon-
sible for the loss of which he was the sole cause, or at any rate was
one of the causes.3 6
Furthermore,
guilt will pass from the highest authority to those subject to it, if those
34 Id., Bk. II, Ch. XXI, § VIII (1), p. 535.
35 Op. cit. supra note 25, at 71 (109).
c Op. cit. supra note 20, Bk. III, Ch. X, § IV, p. 719.
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subject to it have consented to crime, or if they have done anything
by order or advice of the highest authority which they could avoid
doing without committing wrong ...
Guilt, however, attaches to the individuals who have agreed to the
crime, not to those who have been overmastered by the votes of
others .... 87
Grotius was of the opinion "a participation in punishment" re-
sulted "from a participation in guilt.""8 Thus, the rule of "su-
perior orders" would not provide an adequate defense for those
committing a criminal act which resulted from the execution of
an order coming from higher levels.89
Christian von Wolff, a German scholar of the Eighteenth Cen-
tury, "strove for an organic, strictly scientific exposition of inter-
national law."4 Like Grotius, he was greatly concerned with the
doctrines of the "just" and "unjust" war. In regard to the latter
he declared, ".... he who wages an unjust war is a robber, an
invader, and a bandit,"41 while "a just cause of war between
nations arises only when a wrong has been done or is likely to
be done."4 Using the scientific approach he classified just wars.48
37 Id., Bk. II, Ch. XXI, § VII (1) and (2), pp. 534, 535.
:38 Id., Bk. II, Ch. XXI, § IX, p. 537.
"0 Most of the Nazi defendants invoked the rule of "superior orders." For a detailed
examination of the responsibility for executing a superior order see Trial of Nikolaus
van Falkenhorst, 6 WAR CRIMES TRIAL SERIES (London: William Hodge & Co., E. H.
Stevens, 1949).
40 1 FRIEDERICH VON MARTENS, ViiLKERRECHT (German trans. by Bergbohm, Berlin,
1882-1883) 160.
41 Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, 2 THE CLASSICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1934) Ch. VII, § 778, p. 402.
42 d., Ch. VI, § 617, p. 314.
43 Wolff's classification of just wars was as follows:
"Since there are only three just causes of war, namely, (1) reparable wrong,
(2) irreparable wrong, and (3) threatened wrong, which have the threefold
purpose which is aimed at in a legal war, namely, (1) the attainment of one's
own or that which ought to be one's own, (2) the establishing of security, (3)
the preventing of threatened danger or the warding off of injury; undoubtedly
there are three kinds of just war, which are distinguished by their different pur-
poses. Therefore, since that is a defensive war in which the third is aimed at, a
punitive war in which the second is aimed at, it remains for us to give a name to
the war also in which the first purpose is aimed at, and this war it has seemed
best to call a vindicative war in imitation of the vindication of one's property."
Id., Ch. V1, § 620,.p. 316.
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This point of view and method is reflected in his attitude con-
cerning the punishment of States and individuals that have com-
mitted criminal acts.
Wolff believed criminal sanctions could be applied to States,
although the degree or extent of punishment was somewhat dif-
ferent from that described by Grotius. For Wolff, the parallelism
between individual and state punishment was not so close. For
example, Wolff declared that
nation is bound to nation for the penalty for a wrong, in so far as
satisfaction is to be given for the wrong. For it is self-evident that
there is no place here for penalties, either capital, or those affecting
the person, or those which consist in infamy, such as are inflicted
in a state by the sovereign upon those committing crime, but only for
those which consist in payment and therefore have the character of
a fine. Therefore, infamy does not attach to these penalties as to civil
penalties. .. 44
Thus, a fine or reparations, which were charged to the nation as
a whole, could be inflicted upon a State for injury resulting
from the use of unjust force. Again in the words of Wolff,
Those things which are done in war by unjust force are charged to the
nation as a whole, and not to the individuals as individuals. Therefore,
although we assume that the act of the corporate body deserves
punishment, nevertheless, since no one can be punished for the act of
another, and since any one of those who share the punishment with
each other is punished for his own act, by which he concurs in the
act of another, individuals cannot submit to that punishment which
the corporate body deserves.... Therefore, although an unjust belliger-
ent may be a robber and a brigand, and robbery and brigandage may
be chargeable to the nation which the ruler of the state represents,
nevertheless on this account it is not to be said that any one of the
individual persons is guilty of robbery and brigandage.... [N] ations
cannot be punished for using unjust force in war in the way in which
it is customary for robbers and brigands to be punished or as has been
introduced by a positive law. By the right to punish provision is made
for security in the future, and from this purpose in the existing cir-
44 Id., Ch. VII, § 789, p. 408.
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cumstances is to be determined how much is allowable to attain that
purpose.45
Nevertheless, Wolff did admit that
war properly speaking may not be engaged in except by those who by
force seek their right against another, those who seek for war as an
end in itself cannot be said to wage war, but they practice brigandage,
and are to be compared to robbers whose malice extends to the farthest
limit. Therefore, the right to punish them belongs to all nations, and
by this right they can remove from their midst those fierce monsters
of the human kind, consequently they have the right to punitive war
[in order to establish security] .... 46
It should be noted that Wolff believed an unjust war violated
the "law of humanity."4 The latter found expression in the
writings of Vattel, and later provided one of the bases for the
conviction of the war criminals following the termination of
World War II. Also he declared that
one is not bound to obey a ruler Who commands what is contrary to
the law of nature, nor does an evil deed cease to be such for the
reason that it is done by the order of a ruler, nor does illegal obedience
take from another a right gained because of the wrongful act.4 8
Again, the rule of "superior orders" could not be invoked as a
defense if the action was contrary to the law of nature.
Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767), the disciple of Wolff,
brought the doctrines of the latter, "with certain modifications,
45Id., Ch. VII, § 814, pp. 421-422. Wolff was able to conclude that "... those are
too hasty in their judgment who confuse the individuals of the corporate body with the
corporate body, the penalties allowed by the law of nature of nations with the penalties
decreed by positive law against robbers and brigands, and who make the different
methods of concurring in the act of another identical with the act itself. Grotius with
his keenness seems to have sufficiently distinguished them, although he has not fully
explained all the details." Ibid.
46"d., Ch. VI, § 627, p. 319.
47 "The war of those who, influenced neither by justifying nor by persuasive
reasons, are carried into wars, is not only unjust but also transgresses the law of
humanity." Id., Ch. VI, § 626, p. 318.
48 Id., Ch. VI, § 758, p. 391. Also "those ... are not to be excused who knowingly
defend the unjust cause of their ruler, and confirm his mind in error." Id., Ch. VII,
§ 891, p. 456.
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into the domain of practical life."' 9 According to Vattel "the
purpose or lawful object of every war" was "to avenge or to
prevent an injury." Therefore, the three-fold objects of lawful
war were: "(1) to obtain what belongs to us, or what is due to
us; (2) to provide for our future security by punishing the
aggressor or the offender; (3) to defend ourselves, or to pro-
tect ourselves from injury, by repelling unjust attacks. The first
two points are the object of offensive war, the third is the object
of defensive war."5 Like his predecessors, Vattel enumerated
the types of unjust wars.' Furthermore,
Nations which are always ready to take up arms when they hope
to gain something thereby are unjust plunderers; but those who appear
to relish the horrors of war, who wage it on all sides without reason
or pretext, and even without other motive than their savage inclina-
tions, are monsters, unworthy of the name of men. They should be
regarded as enemies of the human race, just as in civil society persons
who follow murder and arson as a profession commit a crime not
only against the individuals who are victims of their lawlessness, but
against the State of which they are the declared enemies. Other nations
are justified in uniting together as a body with the object of punish-
ing, and even of exterminating, such savage peoples .... 52
As noted above, Vattel declared that one of the objects of
lawful war was "to provide for our future security by punish-
ing the aggressor or the offender." In other words, a punitive
war for such purpose was a just war. This raised the question
of the location of guilt- in the nation as a whole or its ruler.
This problem, which has been the subject of much debate, did
49 SIR JOHN MACDONELL AND EDWARD MANSON, GREAT JURISTS OF THE WORLD
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1914) p. 504.
50 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or The Principles of Natural Law, 3 THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Washington: The Carnegie Institute, 1916) Bk.
III, Ch. III, § 28, p. 244.
51 For example, "if a Nation takes up arms when it has not received an injury and
when it has not been threatened, it wages an unjust war. . . .Pretexts [as grounds
for war] ...War undertaken solely for gain ...Nations which make war without
cause, and without apparent motives .. . [a defensive war waged to resist a nation
waging a just war]"....Id., Bk. III, Ch. III, §§ 27, 32-35, pp. 244-246.
52 Id., Bk. III, Ch. III, § 34, pp. 245, 246.
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not prove a difficult one for Vattel. In the words of the great
Swiss writer,
He [the sovereign who wages an unjust war] is answerable for all
the evils and all the disasters of the war.... He is guilty towards the
enemy, whom he attacks, oppresses, and massacres without cause; he
is guilty towards his people, whom he leads into acts of injustice,
whom he exposes to danger without necessity or reason-towards those
of his subjects who are ruined or injured by the war, who lose their
lives, their property, or their health because of it; finally, he is guilty
towards all mankind, whose peace he disturbs and to whom he sets
so pernicious an example....
He who does an injury is bound to repair it, or to give just satisfac-
tion if the evil is irreparable; he is even bound to submit to punish-
ment, if that be necessary as an example, or as an assurance to the
injured party or to human society of his future good conduct. Such
is the plight of a prince who carries on an unjust war. He must restore
whatever he has taken, and send back at his own expense the prisoners;
he must indemnify the enemy for the harm he has done and the losses
he has caused; he must relieve families that have suffered, and repair,
if possible, the loss of a father, a son, or a husband. 53
After establishing the multi-guilt of the Prince,. who wages
an unjust war, as well as considering the nature of the punish-
ment to be inflicted, Vattel presented some basic questions in
regard to the ability of the Prince to repair or give just satisfac-
tion for his misdeeds. Here again one observes the practical
approach.
But how shall he repair so many evils? Many are of their nature
irreparable. And as for those for which an equivalent may be offered
in satisfaction, from what source will the unjust belligerent draw in
order to compensate for his acts of violence? The private property
of the Prince would be insufficient for the purpose. Is he to give away
that of his subjects? It does not belong to him. Shall he sacrifice the
national domain, and make over a part of the State? But the State
is not his patrimony (Book I, § 61), and he may not dispose of it at
will. And although the nation is responsible, to a certain extent, for
the acts of its ruler, still, apart from the fact that it would be unjust
53 Id., Bk. III, Ch. XI, §§ 184 and 185, p. 302.
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to punish the nation directly for offenses of which it is not guilty,
this responsibility exists only towards other nations, which may look
to it for redress (Book I, § 40; Book II, §§ 81, 82). Consequently
the sovereign may not force it to bear the penalty of his unjust acts,
nor despoil it in order to make amends for them .... Weigh all these
matters, ye rulers of Nations, and when you have come to see clearly
that an unjust war leads you into endless misdeeds which it is beyond
all your power to repair, perhaps you will be less ready to engage
in one.54
Vattel believed that only the sovereign could be held respon-
sible for the damage or injury resulting from an unjust war.
He rejected the view of Grotius, since the rule of "superior
orders" could be invoked as a defense for inferiors who carried
out an order of a superior. Vattel declared:
The restoration of conquests, prisoners, and of property which can
be given back in kind presents no difficulty when the injustice of the
war is recognized . . . . But as regards repairing the damage that
has been done, are the generals, officers, and soldiers bound in con-
science to make good the wrongs which they have done, not of their
own will, but as instruments in the hands of their sovereign? I am
surprised that so rational a thinker as Grotius should decide without
qualification in the affirmative. 55 His view is only tenable in the case
of a war so clearly and unquestionably unjust as not to admit the suppo-
sition of any secret motive of state policy which might justify it-a
case hardly possible where States are concerned. On all occasions open
to doubt, the Nation as a body, the individual citizens, and above all
the military, should submit their judgment to those who govern, to the
sovereign; their duty to do so arises from the essential principles of
political society and of government. What would authority amount
to if, at every step taken by the sovereign, his subjects could weigh
the justice of his motives? If they could refuse to march to a war
which did not seem tothem to be just? Indeed, it often happens that
prudence will not allow the sovereign to make known his motives. It
is the duty of subjects to presume that his motives are just and wise,
so long as the evidence to the contrary is not clear and convincing.
When, therefore, in this spirit of submission they have given their
assistance to a war which afterwards proves to have been unjust, the
54 d., Bk. III, Ch. XI, § 186, pp. 302, 303.
55 DE JURE BELLI Ac PACis LIBRI TRES, Ch. X.
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sovereign alone is guilty, and he alone is under obligation to repair
the wrong done. The subjects, and especially the military, are innocent;
they have done no more than obey, as was their duty; and they are
only called upon to give up what they have taken in such a war, since
they hold it without lawful title .... Government would be impossible
if every public official insisted upon examining and thoroughly under-
standing the justice of the commands given him before executing them.
But if, for the good of the State, subjects must presume that the orders
of the sovereign are just, they are not responsible for them."
The conflict between Grotius and Vattel concerning "superior
orders" was resolved in the Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind formulated by the United Na-
tions International Law Commission in 1951. ("The fact that a
person charged with an offense defined in this Code acted pur-
suant to order of his Government or of a superior does not
relieve him from responsibility, provided a moral choice was in
fact possible to him", Article IV, Draft Code).
The writings of Vitoria, Grotius, Wolff, Vattel and others
helped to establish the notion of the illegality of aggressive war
rather than its criminality in the sense of penal law. Neverthe-
less, the moral and juridical aspirations of jurists and commen-
tators, howsoever noble, "are resorted to by judicial tribunals,
not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is."57 It is in this spirit that the "teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations" may be con-
sidered "as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law" (Article 38 (d), Statute of The International Court of Jus-
tice). In short, recognition of the illegality of aggressive war by
many of the early writers did not create a rule of law. Hence
the jurists and statesmen of the Twentieth Century were con-
fronted with the difficult task of translating the concept into
positive law.
16 Op. cit. supra note 50, Bk. III, Ch. XI, § 187, p. 303.




The concept of aggressive war, as well as the right to take
punitive action against those who wage such a war, has been in
the process of development for many centuries. During the forma-
tive years the principle was interwoven with the doctrine of the
just war (bellum iustum). The latter was in the nature of "a
reaction against a wrong, a procedure either in tort (restitution,
reparations, guarantees) or in criminal law (punishment, sanc-
tions)." Such a doctrine was of "Catholic origin, anchored in
natural law, [and] a theological,... [rather than] a legal con-
cept."59 Yet, "International law, or the law that governs between
states," as Mr. Justice Cardozo put it, "has at times, like the
common law within states, a twilight existence during which it is
hardly distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length the
'imprimatur of a court attests its jural quality'."6 Many rules
of positive law were, at their inception, based upon theology or
natural law.
In the Roman Period the College of Fetials and Senate would
decide whether or not a just cause for war existed. Upon the
successful termination of the war Rome determined the nature
and extent of the punishment to be assessed, either against the
defeated nation as a whole or against the authors of the war.
In either case Rome was not only a party involved, but also
judge of her own cause. Also one of the major deficiencies of
the natural law was that the determination of the justice of the
-cause was left to the rulers themselves who were expressly recog-
nized as judges in their own cause. In fact, little effort was
devoted to devising criteria and means by which a more im-
partial judgment could be obtained. Likewise in the modem
period, the victorious State or States are judge of their own
58 Editorial Comment by Josef L. Kunz, "Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale," 45 Am.
J. Int. L. 528, 530 (1951).
59 Ibid.
60 New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U. S. 361, 383 (1934).
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cause. In all criminal prosecutions, whether at the local or in-
ternational level, criminals are apprehended, tried and punished
by the victor - the latter being represented by the power of
the individual State or international community. Nevertheless,
a valid technique must be found for determining when an act
of aggression has been committed by a State.
In the Twentieth Century the international community has been
more concerned with peace and security than philosophical dis-
cussions concerning what constitutes a "just" or "unjust" war.
Since the termination of World War I considerable effort has
been made to convert the earlier theory of aggressive war into
a rule of positive law. For example, numerous treaties have
been concluded which outlaw aggressive war.6 Also the prin-
ciple was included in the Charter of the Niiremberg Tribunal as
"Crimes Against Peace" (inter alia, the "initiation or waging
of a war of aggression. .")," and has been incorporated in
the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of
"I Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Aug. 27, 1928); the Anti-War Treaty of
Non-Aggression and Conciliation (signed at Rio de Janeiro, Oct. 10, 1933) ; the Act of
Chapultepec (March 8, 1945) ; the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Sept. 2, 1947) ; the Charter of the Organization of American States (signed at Bogoti,
April 30, 1948) ; Charter of the United Nations (Art. 2, 1 4) ; and the draft Declaration
on Rights and Duties of States, prepared by the International Law Commission, Art. 9.
"A comparison of the law of the [UN] Charter with classic International Law," accord-
ing to M. A. Verdross, "shows that one of the great innovations of the Charter is the
prohibition of resort to force for the solution of international disputes. It is true that
the Covenant of the League of Nations abolished, in principle, the right of States to
be judges in their own cause. It did not, however, oblige its Members to renounce
resort to war in all cases. A step forward was taken by the Pact of Paris of 1928 gener-
ally known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which imposed an obligation upon States not
to resort to war as an instrument of national policy. It did not, however, forbid military
reprisals. The first general provision expressly forbidding States to resort to force in
their international relations is therefore Art. 2(4) of the Charter. It obliges the Mem-
bers of the Organization to abstain not only from the use of force, but also from the
threat of force, in their international relations." "Guiding Notions Concerning the
Organization of the United Nations," lecture delivered at The Hague Academy of
International Law, Summer, 1953. "In neither instrument is war declared to be illegal.
The Charter, however, makes a large advance over the Covenant by omitting the word
'war' and forbidding the use of force by a state in a manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the Organization (art. 2, par, 4, and ch. VII)." Clyde Eagleton, Covenant
of the League of Nations and Charter of The United Nations: Points of Difference,
13 Dept. State Bull. 263, 266 (No. 321, Aug. 19, 1945).
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Mankind. 8 This development represents, in a sense, the crystal-
lization of the earlier notion of the illegality of aggressive war.
Furthermore, as a result of the cooperative arrangements estab-
lished under the League of Nations and the United Nations
Charter, the older doctrine of a just war (the right of a State to
wage a punitive war against an unjust aggressor) has been re-
placed by the doctrine of a legal war- a war which may be
necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Notwithstanding recent trends in the law, there are some that
contend that States are the only proper subjects of international
law. Therefore, it is argued that since the law provides no sanc-
tions for individual offences, the authors of such offences can-
not be proper subjects of the law. This view, which is based
upon a rather fine distinction between proper subjects and objects
of law, does not represent a realistic approach to the problem.
Nations are composed of individuals; and the latter are, either
directly or indirectly, affected by the law. In short, "The final
object of the law of nations is not the protection of the imper-
sonal interests of juridical entities termed states, governments,
or sovereigns. It is the protection of the ordinary common interests
of 'peoples'."" Hence, the International Law Commission pro-
vided in Article I of The Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind that "[o]ffences against the peace
and security of mankind, as defined in this Code [including acts
of aggression, among other crimes], are crimes under interna-
tional law, for which the responsible individuals shall be punish-
able." Additional sanctions for individual offences may be in-
corporated into the law in the future. If such be the trend in the
law, the latter may evolve into a world code as the States draw
ss Art. 2.
64 Philip Marshall Brown, The Legal Effects of Recognition, 44 Am. J. Int. L. 617,
618 (1950). According to the Niiremberg judgment, "Crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced." 1 TRIAL OF




closer together or possibly unite within a world federal system.
Regardless, the law envisages a close interrelationship between
the nation as such and those that live within its jurisdiction.
Despite the continuous development of an international crim-
inal law over the centuries, the law, as yet, may not be classified
as a mature law. If compared with established standards of na-
tional or local penal law, the international criminal law may
be considered an instrument of pioneer justice. In a sense, "these
are pioneer days in world law."6 This is particularly true in
the field of penal law. International criminal law, as it has
developed to the present, "is very much in the state that common
law was in Blackstone's time."66 Yet considerable progress has
been made in the development of the law.
65 Comment, Genocide: A Commentary on the Covention, 58 Yale L. J. 1142,
1157 (1949).
66 Statement of Dana Converse Backus, Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate
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